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Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have indicated that 
addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the need for 
further disarmament are key features of their respective security strategies. The United 
Nations Security Council, in a recent debate chaired by President Obama, has reaffirmed 
that the proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and 
called upon all states to further work toward disarmament. State parties recently reviewed 
one of the pillars ofthe global non-proliferation regime, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in May 2010. In addition, a new Treaty on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was revised this year and is 
scheduled for votes in Russia and the United States in the coming months. Still, recent 
developments concerning the Islamic Republic oflran and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea) have highlighted the importance of strengthening the 
current non-proliferation regime and the need for new and more effective means of 
enforcement. 
The Obama Administration has announced a number of key initiatives to advance 
this objective, and the EU has indicated that it wishes to promote and give effect to its 
security strategy, including through the continued development of dialogue, coordination 
and cooperation with the United States. Moreover, the international community has 
demonstrated a willingness to support such measures through affirmative votes in the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on Resolution 1540 1, which was intended to 
1 See UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). 
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prevent proliferation to non-state actors and states of proliferation concern. In addition, 
Resolutions 1718 and 1929 have targeted specific violations made by North Korea and 
Iran respectively. Finally, international summits that promote dialogue and cooperation 
among states have grown in frequency and scope2• These events and subsequent 
agreements encourage governments to maintain their focus on the issue of non-
proliferation among the myriad challenges they face. In addition to the aforementioned 
resolutions and other international legal measures, the international community and state 
governments alike must also consider alternative methods at countering WMD 
proliferation, which has been identified as fundamental to peace and security in the 
Twenty-First Century. 
With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that 
result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have 
come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the 
EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, 
limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other 
governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international 
resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this 
paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine 
implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of 
increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and 
material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran 
will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions 
2 Mace, Gordon and Hugo Loiseau. "Cooperative Hegemony and Summitry in the Americas" in Latin 
American Politics and Society, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter, 2005), pp. 107-134. 
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from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and 
non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an 
effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Tile core ofthe non-proliferation regime can be fouud in the Treaty onJhe Non-
Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, which went into force on 5 March I 9703. After 
decades of negotiation among the five nuclear powers and the international community, 
the treaty set out eleven provisions that are designed to limit the spread and use of nuclear 
weapons while providing the necessary research support to those states who seek to 
harness nuclear energy for peaceful means. This binding agreement also created the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which acts as an oversight mechanism for 
state parties and may conduct investigations of alleged violations to the treaty as well as 
provide guidance for safeguarding nuclear material. As signatories to the treaty, states 
with nuclear weapons are called upon to decrease the size of their arsenals while those 
states that do not have weapons are asked not to develop them4• Although this grand 
compromise appealed to all parties to the convention during the time of ratification, 
several states have either subsequently withdrawn from or refused to sign the NPT in 
order to pursue weapons programs that fit their national interests. North Korea is the 
only state to have withdrawn from the treaty regime5 while India, Israel, and Pakistan 
3 See "Brief Background on Non-proliferation Treaty" accessed from 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/> 
4 See the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accessed from 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/N uclear/pdf!NPTEnglish _Text. pdf> 
5 Chafee, Devon. "North Korea's Withdrawal from Non-Proliferation Treaty Official" from Nuclear Age 
Peace Foundation. 10 April 2003. Accessed from 
<http://www. wagingpeace.org/articles/2003/0411 0 _ chaffee _ korea-npt.htm> 
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never added their names to the list of state parties6• Despite this alarming behavior, the 
NPT has been ratified by former nuclear weapons states as well. These include countries 
like South Africa and the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 7• 
Such responsible actions by governments ought to encourage the global community to 
continue its pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. 
A variety of international relations theories define interactions among states as 
reflective of the interest of individual governments and their need for survival in the 
Westphalian system 8• While withdrawal from the NPT is often seen as a threat to 
international and regional stability, this act is not outside the customary bounds of 
acceptable behavior given that states may act in their own self-interest. In fact, the 
United States has been known to "unsign" or refuse to ratifY international agreements on 
a variety of issues out of alleged concern for its national security or fundamental values9• 
Still, there have been states that do act in violation of nuclear treaty obligations without 
taking the necessary steps to withdraw from the NPT. The IAEA has conducted 
investigations over alleged nuclear weapons programs and research facilities in Iraq, 
North Korea, and Iran at the urging of member states and international organizations. 
Demonstrating the resolve of the international community to thwart the spread of nuclear 
weapons, the United Nations Security Council has authorized inspections of scientific 
6 
"World Leaders Urge Non-signatories to Sign NPT" in Times of India. 4 May 2010. Accessed from 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/World-leaders-urge-non-signatories-to-sign-
NPT/articleshow/5888287.cms> 
7 Federation of American Scientists. "The Nuclear Information Project." 2009. Accessed from 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/World-leaders-urge-non-signatories-to-sign-
NPT/articleshow/5888287.cms> 
8 Wendt, AE. ''The agent-structure problem in internatiOnal relations theory." International Organization. 
2009, Cambridge Press. 
9 See status of Rome Statute and Kyoto Protocol. 
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facilities through the support of state parties to the NPT. As technology and globalization 
increase their respective roles in the global community, the international non-
proliferation regime will require a renewed commitment from governments, academia, 
and military personnel to work together in order to ensure effective monitoring of critical 
materials and procll[ction. 
While the non-proliferation regime relies heavily on international agreements to 
limit states from using or obtaining nuclear weapons, individual governments may also 
take steps on their own to encourage international actors to comply with these standards. 
Short of military force, the most common form of coercion to change state behavior is 
found in diplomatic and/or economic sanctions. These tools are implemented in order to 
deter a state from acting against the will of another state without resort to armed conflict. 
As mentioned previously, Iran is the only state that is currently acting in violation of its 
NPT obligations. Beginning in November 2003, the international community cited 
numerous reports from watchdog organizations that report Iran acting counter to the 
IAEA Safeguards Agreement10, which it signed in 1974. Four years later, the EU and US 
have imposed a number of sanctions on the Iranian government due to its non-
compliance with the NPT and recommendations made by the IAEA. These sanctions 
follow mostly from UNSC resolutions, which began threatening action against Iran for its 
nuclear activities as early as 2006 11 • The most recent of these resolutions is UNSC 
Resolution 1929, adopted on 9 June 2010. With Tehran recently announcing construction 
10See "Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers." 21 October 2003. 
Accessed from <http:/ /www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Iaeairan/statement_iran2 I I 02003 .shtml> 
11 !AEA Director General. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran." 27 February 2006. Accessed from 
<http://www.iaea.org/Fublications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006- I 5. pdf> 
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often new nuclear enrichment facilities 12, the international community will need to act 
quickly in order to prevent the growth and possible weaponization oflran's program. To 
this end, the US and EU announced their own unilateral sanctions that were designed to 
target specific sectors of the offending state while giving deference to the IAEA and UN 
Security Council. These measures will be discussed in greater detail in following section 
of this paper. 
CASE STUDY: RESPONSE TO IRANIAN NUCLEAR AMBITIONS 
International Legal Framework 
A number oflegally binding international agreements is focused on the threat of 
WMD proliferation. In addition to those safeguards implemented under the NPT, the 
United Nations Security Council has passed several resolutions targeting emerging 
nuclear programs. Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, called upon states to refrain from 
--providing-any form~e-f-suppM:-t&-internati<mal-act-er-s-that-attempt-t{)-"develop,-acquire,--
manufacture, posses, transport, transfer, or use" weapons of mass destruction and directs 
member states to "adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws" in their domestic 
systems 13 • UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, and 1803subsequently set the 
framework for sanctions that specifically targeted the Iranian nuclear program 
specifically. Resolution 1696 was adopted in 2006 by the UNSC following more than 
three years oflranian non~compliance with the NPT and failure to cooperate with the 
12 Erdbrink, Thomas. "Ahmedinejad vows dramatic expansion of Iran's nuclear program" in The 
Washington Post. 30 November 2009. Accessed from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp· 
dyn/content/article/2009/Jl/29/AR2009112900992.httnl> 
13 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.28 April2004. Accessed from 
<http://www.state.gov/tlisn/73519 .htm> 
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!AEA 14• Four months earlier, the UNSC President had issued a statement calling on Iran 
to suspend its nuclear program. After failing to bring its program in line with accepted 
standards, Resolution 1696 gave Iran thirty days to suspend all "enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities" or else face UNSC sanctions 15 • Following Iran's prolonged 
failure to comply, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737 in the same year. This resolution. 
called upon all member states to prevent Iran from obtaining "all items, materials, 
equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, 
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon 
delivery systems." Furthermore, the resolution prohibited states from providing technical 
or financial assistance, including investment, to people or entities related to Iran's nuclear 
activities. The resolution also limited the travel and froze the funds of certain Iranian 
nationals and entities. Finally, it gave Iran sixty days to either comply with the NPT 
regulations and UNSC Resolutions 1696 and 1737 or face further sanctions 16• After Iran 
failed once again to comply with UNSC resolutions, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1747 in 2007. This added an arms embargo to the existing sanctions on Iran. 
The resolution also imposed yet another sixty-day deadline for Iran to suspend prohibited 
nuclear activities or be confronted with another round of sanctions 17• 
14 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 (2006). 
15 UN Department of Public Information. "Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment 
by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions" 31 July 2006. Accessed from 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm> 
16 UN Department of Public Information. "Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt 
Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737." 23 December2006. Accessed from 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm> 
17 UN Department of Public Information. "Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Iran, Adds Arms 
Embargo with Unanimous Adoption ofResolution 1747. 24 March 2007. Accessed from 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007 /sc8980.doc.htm> 
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Due to continued non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 1803 in 2008. This resolution expanded the list of people and entities 
subject to travel restrictions and funds freezes. Furthermore, it called upon states to 
monitor the activity of subsidiaries and branches of"all banks domiciled in Iran" for 
potential links to the nuclear program. The resolution also required states to inspect 
cargoes going in and out of Iran on airplanes and boats owned by Iran Air Cargo and 
Islamic Republic ofiran Shipping Line when they reach member states' airports and 
seaports and to report the results of these inspections to the UNSC. Finally, the 
resolution set a deadline of ninety days from its adoption for Iran to cooperate with the 
IAEA and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities while leaving the door 
open for further sanctions in the event ofiran's sustained failure to comply 18. 
The most recent set of sanctions on Iran was created by the adoption ofUNSC 
Resolution 1929 on 9 June 2010. While it maintains the arms embargo and the asset 
freezes on Iranian nationals and entities, and bans Iranian investment in "sensitive 
nuclear activities abroad," the resolution also prohibits Iran from taking any action in 
connection with ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the 
resolution expands the cargo inspection regime by calling for inspections not only in the 
territorial waters of member states, but also on the high seas, and by requiring states to 
seize and destroy prohibited items found during inspections. The text broadens the 
sanctions on Iranian banks by prohibiting states from entering into "new banking 
relationships with Iran" or allowing Iranian banks to open new branches abroad. 
Resolution 1929 also targets the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) by freezing 
18 UN Department of Public Information. "Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran's Proliferation-
Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance Over Iranian B.anks, Has States Inspects Cargo." March 
2008. Accessed from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm> 
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the assets of businesses related to tbe IRGC and by calling upon states to require their 
businesses to monitor all transactions that involve the IRGC. Finally, the resolution 
establishes a panel of experts to oversee the implementation of sanctions, report 
violations of sanctions, and work on improving enforcement of the sanctions regime on 
The vote on Resolution 1929 represents how states in the global community 
currently perceive tbe threat to international peace and security posed by Iran. The 
twelve members voting in favor of the document reflect the intentions of a majority of 
governments, including the five permanent members of the Security Council, to thwart 
Iran's progression toward nuclear weapon status. To them, Iran has resisted all efforts at 
diplomatic resolutions and will continue to do so as demonstrated through its reluctance 
to comply with IAEA regulations. Still, a handful of states including Brazil, Turkey, and 
Lebanon wish to pursue alternative options with regard to Iran's nuclear program. They 
believe that providing support for civilian nuclear power will keep Iran from advancing 
down the path toward highly enriched uranium and benefit the broader population20• The 
passage of Resolution 1929 signifies a renewed commitment by the international 
community to halt Iran's uranium enrichment, limit its acquisition of a variety of 
weapons, and increase financial and travel restrictions on the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard, defense officials, scientists, bankers, and other trade officials. Thus, when it 
comes to enforcing sanctions on Iran, the global community can employ a number of 
measures that seek to limit the growth of an illicit nuclear weapons program. 
19 Remarks by UN Ambassador Susan Rice. '~ew UN Security Council Sanctions on Iran." 9 June 2010. 
Accessed from <http:/ /www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/142882.htm> 
20 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. 28 April2004. Accessed from 
<http:/ /www.state.gov/t/isn/73519 .htm> 
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US Strategy Toward Iran 
Since the removal of the Shah in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the United States 
has maintained a strained relationship with Iran given the two countries' perspective of 
its role in the Middle East. Nearly every administration since President Carter has seen 
Iran as a threat to US interests in the region while Tehran has sought to exert greater 
influence over its neighbors through proxy wars and financial support for likeminded 
political organizations. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp and the theocratic 
leadership of the country, which were direct results of the Iranian Revolution and 
currently expert power over the country, are sources of great tension between 
Washington and Tehran21 • While the IRGC did, in fact, limit its research into enrichment 
of fissile material following the Revolution, it has since empowered the existing program 
infrastructure that was in place since the 1960s Atoms for Peace Program22• Many 
scholars and regional experts believe that Iran actually renewed its pursuit of a strong 
nuclear program in the early 1990s as a result of Russian expertise, Evidence of such an 
effort can be found in IAEA reports released in 199223• 
Due to American goals of nuclear disarmament and compliance with international 
legal obligations such as the NPT, the US government has taken a number of steps to 
thwart Iran's ambitions to become a nuclear power. Beginning in 1995, President 
Clinton signed several executive orders that reinforced the terms of the International 
21 Daugherty, William. "Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit the Shah into the United States" 
from American Diplomacy. 2003. Accessed from 
<http://www. unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives _roll/2003 _ 0 1-03/dauherty_ shahidauherty _shah.html> 
22 Roe, Sam. "An atomic threat made in America" in Chicago Tribune. 28 January 2007. Accessed from 
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-061209atoms-day 1-story,0,2034260.htmlstory> 
23 Lunev, Stanislav. Through the Eyes of the Enemy. Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1998 
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Emergency Economic Powers Act and exerted greater pressure on the Iranian 
government to halt research on or production of nuclear material24• While the United 
States had maintained diplomatic sanctions on the government through the absence of an 
embassy and freezing of certain assets, this marked the first time in which the US 
resorted to severe economic restrictions Qn the government. 
Despite the fact that these measures demonstrated greater resolve by the US 
government to enforce the terms of the NPT, export restrictions remained lax and allowed 
for agricultural and medical goods to be exchanged between the two countries. In other 
words, little was actually being done to press the Iranian government where it was most 
vulnerable to internal pressure from citizens and external pressure from trade. Still, such 
enforcement mechanisms promoted a broader appreciation and expectation among 
government agencies and private companies that violations would be investigated and 
action would be taken to punish the guilty party25 • This action has led to a customary 
understanding by corporations that financial transactions with rogue states may come 
under scrutiny by the international community and terminated through legal agreements 
or other forms of coercion. 
Since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1929, the United States has 
taken additional steps to reinforce international efforts at curbing Iran's nuclear 
ambitions. For example, President Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act on I July 2010, which banned all imports from Iran, 
banned all exports to Iran except those protected by existing trade law, and gave the 
24 See Executive Order 12959 (1995). 
25 !bid 
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President broad authority to apply specific sanctions based on circumstances. 
Specifically, the act provided for mandatory financial sanctions, tougher human rights 
penalties for Iranian abusers, and restrictions on the sale of repressive technology with 
provisions that compel the government to investigate violators of the law26• 
In addition to economic limitations, Congress also incorporated the Iran Refined 
Petroleum Sanctions Act into the new law, which sought to limit companies incorporated 
in the United States from supplying refined petroleum to Iran. The sanctions now include 
a ban 'on all imports from Iran except for "informational materials" and those that are 
protected by trade law. The new law is also broader in the sense that it covers 
"investment" in the energy sector as well, which includes finance, insurance, shipping, 
and other industries. This means that financial institutions as well as energy firms will be 
targets trade restrictions and may be prohibited from conducting business and banking or 
property transactions can be subject to penalty. In order to promote sound business 
practices and incentivize compliance with the new statute, the President may now waive 
investigation of a company or may terminate investigation once commenced, if the 
company terminates illegal activity or has taken "significant verifiable steps toward 
stopping the activity." The corporation must also provide the government with "reliable 
assurances" that it will not engage in prohibited business transactions in the future27• 
Thus, by including more robust trade limitations on a critical section oflran 's economy, 
the United States is sending a clear message to the government and international 
26 Comprehensive- Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. 24 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlquerylz?clll :H.R.2194:> 
27 !bid 
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community regarding its commitment to thwart Iran's efforts at expanding its nuclear 
program. 
Another approach that the United States is taking involves opening a dialogue 
with the Iranian government to encourage it join multiparty talks as a way for both states 
to maintain their domestic legitimacy and work toward a comprehensive solution. The 
PS+ I was established and consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council (US, UK, Russia, China, and Japan) and Germany. Negotiations carried out 
under this format take a "dual track strategy" to address Iran's nuclear program. Track 
one of the discussions consists of several comprehensive proposals made by the PS+ 1 to 
encourage the Iranian government to limit operations at its key nuclear facilities and 
implement transparency measures for its nuclear activities. The second track consists of 
Security Council resolutions, which impose sanctions on Iran and demand that it suspend 
all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as well as construction of a 
heavy water reactor. The group is essential to improving communication between the 
states because the US and Iran only operate "interest sections" in proxy governments' 
embassies to correspond to their current cut off in diplomatic relations. In this case, 
Tehran's interests are represented by Pakistan while Washington maintains its section 
within the Swiss embassy. Thus far, the PS+! has produced a number of proposals 
including provisions to encourage Iran to comply with international agreements including 
the prospect of WTO membership, a nuclear R&D program, as well as technological and 
financial assistance28• As of this writing, Tehran has been unwilling to adopt any 
measures that would satisfY the six-country group, although it often submits alternatives 
28 Crail, Peter. "History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue" in Arms Control Association. 
June 2010. Accessed from <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets!lran_Nuclear_Proposals> 
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to the P5+ 1 in an effort to demonstrate good faith or to avoid direct confrontation with 
the international community. 
With the status of the group in jeopardy due to continued renegotiation, the 
United States may consider alternative strategies for confronting Tehran and exerting its 
influence on the government through expanded sanctions or military action. To date, 
government officials have discussed a range of options to keep Iran from reaching its 
perceived goal of highly enriched uranium. One proposal includes targeted strikes on 
Iran's suspected nuclear enrichment facilities. Genera:! Michael Hayden, former Director 
of the CIA, believes that such a move may be necessary because diplomacy is failing. 
According to the Washington Post, General Hayden points to the fact that "We engage. 
They continue to move forward. We vote for sanctions. They continue to move forward. 
We try to deter, to dissuade. They continue to move forward." 29 In other words, a 
military strike may be the only option left in the US arsenal to persuade Iran to abandon 
its nuclear ambitions. Another course of action calls for neighboring states like the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia to increase their engagement with Iran. This would entail the formation 
or support of blockades as well as military buildups by multinational forces on their 
borders with Iran. Recent reports indicate acute patience among Tehran's neighbors in 
the Middle East, which may provide an opportunity for the United States to exert greater 
pressure on the government beyond economic or diplomatic sanctions30• 
29 Simon, Steven and Ray Takeyh. ''If Iran came close to getting a nuclear weapon, would Obama use 
force?" in The Washington Post. I August 2010. Accessed from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/20 I 0/07/30/ AR20 I 0073002672.html> 
30 Black, Ian. "UAE Ambassador backs strike on Iran's nuclear sites" in The Guardian. 7 July 2010. 
Accessed from <http://www.guardian.eo.uk/world/2010/jul/07/uae-envoy-iran-nuclear-sites> 
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Although a military option has always been "on the table," according to 
government officials, many hold reservations about the capability of US armed forces 
who are continuing to engage in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan during a period of 
extended domestic economic downturn. Still, others suggest that if the United States 
does not take such action into its own hands, neigh boring states like Israel or Saudi 
Arabia may preempt the US and engulf the region in a conflict of potentially catastrophic 
proportions31 • Both the gravity and complexity of this situation puts even greater 
pressure on the PS+ 1 talks and existing economic sanctions to move Iran into compliance 
with the NPT and improved relations with the international community. 
A third strategy, undertaken by the Obama Administration, involves ratification of 
the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Although the 
terms of the agreement do not involve the Iranian nuclear program, the treaty does 
reinforce the need to reduce nuclear stockpiles and take further steps toward a world 
without nuclear weapons, The New START treaty requires that the US and Russia be 
limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date that the 
treaty enters into force. Each Party will have the flexibility to determine the structure of 
its strategic forces within the proscribed limits of the treaty32 • Achieving this goal is not 
only important to the broader goal of"global zero," it also strengthens the relationship 
between the United States and Russia, which has played a major role in the development 
oflran's nuclear program and economic growth. Moscow has expressed some concern 
over the absence of any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or 
31 Bolton, John. ''What iflsrael strikes Iran?" in The Wall Street Journal. 12 June 2009. Accessed from 
<http:/ /online. wsj .com/article/NA _ WSJ _pUB :SB 124467678369503997 .html> 
32 Office of the White House Press Secretary. "Key Facts about the New START Treaty." 26 March 2010. 
Accessed from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-:-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty> 
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planned missile defense programs or current or planned US long-range conventional 
strike capabilities33• Some officials in the US government have worked to delay 
ratification of the treaty due to fears that the US will diminish its strategic advantage by 
weakening its nuclear arsenal in a time of great uncertainty. However, plans are in place 
to ratifY the treaty by both parties within the coming year34• By overcoming such 
reservations, Russia and the United States send a forceful message to Iran that this 
bilateral relationship is ongoing, effective, and influential in the global community. 
The American approach to the Iranian nuclear program is, indeed, 
multidisciplinary and extremely complex. Still, the Obama Administration has made 
compliance with the NPT a core element of its national security strategy as reflected in 
renewed sanctions, increased dialogue and summitry, and commitment to its own 
reduction in the US nuclear arsenaL While these components may not ultimately keep 
Iran from further developing its nuclear program or even attaining a nuclear weapon, 
such steps must be taken in order to keep the NPT relevant and demonstrate that the 
international community will not be complacent in enforcing its provisions. 
EU Strategy Toward Iran 
Given the short existence of the European Union as a governing body charged 
with making policy for a continent known for historic conflicts. Despite playing host to 
two world wars and countless border disputes, the continent has spoken largely with one 
voice when it comes to the potential for proliferation ofWMD, especially in the case of 
Iran. The organization has enacted several pieces oflegislation implementing UNSC 
33 Ford, Christopher. "New START and Missile Defense" from The Hudson Institute. 26 July 2010. 
Accessed from <http://www .hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction""j)ublication _ details&id~7207> 
34 Statement from President Barack Obama 8 April2010. Accessed from 
<http://www. whitehouse.gov/blog/20 I 0/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol> 
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., 
resolutions including 1737, 1747, and 1803.35 Council Common Position 
2007/140/CFSP of27 February 2007laid the foundation for the implementation of the 
sanctions in UNSC Resolution 1737 by means of Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 
of20 April2007. 36 The Council Common Position was amended by Council Common 
Position 2007/246/CFSP of23 April2007 in order toincorporate UNSC Resolution 1747 
into the EU sanctions regime on Iran, which was subsequently codified with the 
enactment of Council Regulation (EC) No 618/2007 of5 June 2007. 37 Finally, Council 
Common Position 2008/652/CFSP of7 August 2008 sought to give force to UNSC 
Resolution 1803, which was accomplished with the passage of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1110/2008 of I 0 November 2008.38 
In addition to implementing the sanctions contained in the aforementioned UNSC 
Resolutions, some member states of the EU have imposed broader, unilateral sanctions 
on Iran in recent years. Although the US began imposing harsher unilateral sanctions on 
Iran beginning in 1992, the EU chose instead to adopt a policy of"critical dialogue" with 
Iran and declined to participate in a US-led trade and investment ban with Iran in 1995. 
However, since 2005 the EU has been more inclined toward sanctioning the Iranian 
regime, even choosing to impose sanctions beyond those mandated by the UNSC. One 
35 European Commission. ~'Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in Force." Accessed from 
<http:/ /ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures _ en.pdf> 
36 Official Journal of the European Union. "Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP." 28 February 
2007. Accessed from <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ .do?uri~OJ :L:2007 :061 :0049:0055 :EN :PDF> 
37 Official Journalofthe European Union. "Council Common Position 2007/246/CFSP." 23 April2007. 
Accessed from <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ .do?uri~OJ :L:2007: I 06:0067:0075 :EN :PDF> 
38 Official Journal of the European Union. "Council Common Position 2008/652/CFSP." 7 August 2008. 
Accessed from <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri~OJ:L:2008:213:0058:0070:EN:PDF> 
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such example is the discouragement of domestic companies from engaging in business 
with or investments in Iran. 39 
The UK, for example, has been particularly aggressive in its unilateral sanctions 
on Iran. According to the UK, it had frozen $1.59 billion of Iranian assets pursuant to EU 
and UN sanctions as of June 2009. Along with the other EU countries, it has continued 
to enforce visa bans on senior Iranian officials connected to the nuclear program. In 
October 2009, the UK took further steps to require its financial firms cease doing any 
business with Bank Mellat and Islamic Republic oflran Shipping Lines-entities which 
had been previously sanctioned by the US--due to their suspected involvement in Iran's 
development of nuclear weapons. 40 Due to the fact that Britain remains the closest US 
ally in Europe, it is often the greatest supporter of US non-proliferation policy proposals 
as the two countries is often inter linked on other aspects of their security relationship. 
However, with growing costs from joint efforts in Afghanistan, as well as other fiscal 
challenges facing the new coalition government, it will remain to be seen what measures 
will be promoted on behalf of the United States. 
The European Council set the stage for a more active EU sanctions regime on Iran 
near the end of its 2009 session. In the "Declaration on Iran," the Council articulated its 
policy toward country as falling under the "dual track approach" of diplomacy and 
sanctions. It expressed a desire for diplomatic engagement and negotiation, but also 
affirmed its willingness to pursue sanctions iflran is unwilling to negotiate and fails to 
abide by past UN resolutions regarding its nuclear program. Most significantly, the 
39 Katzrnan, Kenneth. "Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses" found in the Congressional Research 
Service. 6 August 2009. Accessed from <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32048_20090806.pdf.> p. 50 
40 Reuters News Service. "Fact Box: Sanctions Against Iran." 13 October 2009. Accessed from 
<http://www .reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59C22020091 0 13> 
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Council stated that it is prepared not only to support further UNSC sanctions, but also to 
"take the necessary steps to accompany this UNSC process."41 This declaration 
demonstrates a signal of a more aggressive approach on the part of the EU toward the 
nuclear threat posed by Iran. 
Most recently, the EU has expressed a commitment to sanctions that go beyond 
those instituted by UNSC Resolution I 929. On I 7 June 20IO, the Council released 
another "Declaration on Iran," outlining new sanctions. In this document, the Council 
called upon the Foreign Affairs Council to implement the sanctions in UNSC Resolution 
I 929 as well as additional sanctions regarding the restriction of the trade of "dual use 
goods" and of trade insurance. The Declaration also called for further restrictions on 
Iranian banks and on Iranian transport companies, including the Islamic Republic of!ran 
Shipping Line. Furthermore, the document promoted sanctions that target the Iranian oil 
and gas industry by preventing "new investment, technical assistance and transfers of 
technologies, equipment and services related to these areas, in particular related to 
refining, liquefaction and LNG technology." Finally, the Council recommended 
expanding the system of visa bans and asset freezes in order to specifically target the 
IRGC. 42 On 26 July 20IO, the European Union finalized the measures discussed above, 
which will reinforce both international efforts as well as those of its allies and member 
states. 
One perspective on the EU sanctions is that they help to fill in the most glaring 
gaps in UNSC Resolution I 929 and reinforce steps taken by the United States to restrict 
41 General Secretariat of the Council. "Conclusions: 10/11 December 2009." Accessed from 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111877.pdf> p.l6 
42 Reuters News Service. "European Union statement on Iran sanctions." 17 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http:/ /in.reuters.com/article/idiNLDE65G I OP20 I 00617> 
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Iran's access to technology and funding sources for its nuclear program. Following the 
adoption of this resolution, many Western commentators declared the sanctions to be 
ineffective as a result of negotiations with Russia and China, who oppose any sanctions 
on Iran's oil and gas industries due to their significant economic interest in those areas. 
Some claim that the UN' s failure to target Iran's oil and gas industries has been a 
significant factor in the ineffectiveness of past sanctions, as they are among Iran's "vital 
economic interests." The energy sector is of particular r~levance for Iran because it not 
only benefits from its sale of unrefined oil, but it also does not have the capability to 
refine enough oil for use in its own country and therefore must import "finished 
petroleum products."43 The oil industry alone brings in tens of billions of dollars in 
revenue to Iran each year. Thus, critics of Resolution 1929 have deemed it as weak since 
it creates only a minor inconvenience for Iran and is clearly insufficient in applying real 
pressure on the government to reconsider its nuclear policy. 44 
The proposed EU sanctions target the Iranian oil and gas industries in several 
ways. First, the EU intends to prohibit new investment by its companies in the Iranian oil 
and gas industry, which has been established as a major source of revenue for Iran. 
Second, the EU will ban "transfers of technologies, equipment and services" that would 
allow Iran to refine its own oil, as it is currently dependent on imports of refined oil 
products. 45 However, it is uncertain how effective these sanctions will be in placing 
43 Reynolds, Paul. "New UN Sanctions Will Not Deter Iran." 9 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle _east/! 02761 OO.stm> 
44 Takeyh, Ray. "Sanctions Will Not Curb Iran's Nuclear Ambitions" from the Council on Foreign 
Relations. 10 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/22414/sanctions _will_ not_ curb _irans _nuclear _ambitions.html> 
45 Reuters News Service. "European Union statement on Iran Sanctions." 17 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http:/ /in.reuters.com/article/id!NLDE65G I OP20 l 00617> 
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pressure on the Iranian regime. Although the sanctions prohibit new investment, the EU 
is Iran's top trading partner and a number of companies, particularly in Denmark, Spain, 
Italy and Austria, already have significant investments in Iran. 46 Furthermore, there is a 
"longstanding practice" among German companies that have major trade ties with Iran, 
of exporting products through Dubai in order to avoid admitting business ventures with 
Iran. This practice allows EU companies to circumvent the restrictions imposed upon 
their business dealings with Iran by the proposed sanctions. 47 Enforcement by both the 
EU and the member states will be critical in monitoring divestment and ensuring that 
corporations comply with existing statutes. Still, it is significant that China and Russia 
do not support the oil and gas sanctions and therefore could lessen the pressure on Iran by 
filling in the gaps in investment and imports left by the EU sanctions. 48 While a present 
challenge, this situation demonstrates that continued dialogue and partnership among the 
international community will be necessary in order to limit the proliferation ofWMD 
technology in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world. 
Despite the strength of recent EU sanctions, it is important to consider their 
feasibility in light of clashing interests and opinions among the various EU members. 
The four countries that seem to pose the greatest threat to a uniform EU sanctions regime 
46 Ottolenghi, Emanuele. "Iran and the European Moment" in The Wall Street Journal. 21 June 2010. 
Accessed from 
<http:/ /online. wsj .com/article/SB 100014240527 4870412290457 53148 8083350845 8.htm1?mod~googlenew 
s_wsj> 
47Schultz, Teri. "EU Sanctions Target Iran Investments" in Global Post. 20 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http:/ /www.g1oba1post.com/dispatch/european-union/1 00619/eu-sanctions-iran-un-nuclear-
weapons?page=O,O> 
48 Hafezi, Parisa. "Iran Says it is Undeterred by EU Sanctions Plan" from Reuters News Service. 15 June 
2010. Accessed from <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65E18820100615> 
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are Germany, Sweden, Cyprus, and Spain. 49 Germany is the number one trading partner 
with Iran in the EU, with exports to Iran totaling nearly four billion euro in 2008. There 
is fear among many that, given German companies' historic reluctance to reduce trade 
with Iran and their common practice of sending exports to Iran through other ports to 
hide their trade with Iran, Germany will pose a problem for the uniformity ofEU 
sanctions. In addition, Sweden maintains that sanctions are less effective than 
engagement and therefore is likely to attempt to constrain the scope ofEU sanctions. 50 
This opposition to sanctions generally can be seen not only in its rhetoric but also by its 
refusal, during its tjme as president of the EU, to endorse any sanctions against Iran after 
it arrested the British embassy's non-diplomatic personnel in Tehran. The Swedish 
foreign minister has already criticized the sanctions contained in UNSC Resolution 1929, 
which are milder than those proposed by the EU. 51 Furthermore, Sweden, like Germany, 
has a number of companies that are involved in the Iranian oil and gas industries and is 
said to be most strongly opposed to the unilateral sanctions. 52 While the sanctions 
measured was ultimately adopted, a significant responsibility will be placed on member 
states to ensure compliance with sanctioning regimes that are passed by the EU and 
Security Council. 
49 Traynor, Ian. "EU to Introduce New Iran Sanctions" in The Guardian. 15 June 2010. Accessed from 
<http://www.guardian.co. uk/world/20 I 0/j un/15/eu-sanctions-iran-nuclear-programme> 
5
° Castle, Stephen. "EU Signals New Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program" in The New York 
Times. 14 June 2010. Accessed from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/world/europe/15iht-
sanctions.html> ' 
51 0ttolenghi, Emanuele. "Iran and the European Moment" in The Wall Street Journal. 21 June 2010. 
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52 Rettman, Andrew. "EU Diplomat: No Details on Iran Sanctions Until July" in EU Observer. 17 June 
2010. Accessed from <http://euobserver.com/9/30309> 
241 Page 
Cyprus and Spain have expressed opposition to the proposed EU sanctions as 
well. Along with Greece and Malta, Cyprus is concerned over the lost income from 
Iranian shipping lines that will result from the sanctions. 53 On the other hand, Spain, 
which currently holds the EU presidency, has national energy companies with significant 
interests in Iran. This renders it unlikely to support enforcement of stringent sanctions 
that target the Iranian oil and gas industries. 54 In light of Spain's faltering economy, the 
downfall of which would have a severely negative impact on the rest of the EU, such 
cooperation will be difficult to achieve and may require innovative solutions for 
collaboration. 55 
The effectiveness of the EU sanctions must be evaluated in light of the fact that 
they are unilateral. Although the US is also pursuing unilateral sanctions against Iran, the 
nation does not face the same level of pressure from the rest of the world. The lack of 
international consensus on the appropriate content of sanctions lessens their effect on 
Iran. Russia has repeatedly criticized the sanctions proposed by the EU and by the US 
and has stated that it considers these unilateral measures to amount to a dismissal of 
Russia's opinion on the matter. 56 Some observers warn that the unilateral sanctions 
undertaken by the EU, along with the perceived insult to Russia and China as permanent 
530ttolenghi, Emanuele. "Iran and the European Moment" in The Wall Street Journal. 21 June 2010. 
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members of the UNSC, could lead to greater cooperation between Russia, China, and 
Iran. 57 This would severely undermine the objectives of the sanctions and further 
polarize the UNSC, hindering its ability to act effectively against the Iranian nuclear 
threat. Continued dialogue in the international community will thus be essential if a 
world without nuclear weapons is to be achieved, as expressed by the heads of state 
present in Washington in 2010. 
POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION 
In a globalized world, states must take proactive measures to combat illegal 
activity that pose risks to the entire human family. Through coordination, collaboration, 
and innovation, all states parties to multilateral agreements can work together to prevent 
the spread of dangerous materials throughout the international system. In just the past 
decade alone, the global community has developed a broad framework from which 
governments from around the world can play an integral role in eliminating the threat 
posed by WMD. Although a number of concrete programs have been discussed or 
introduced, several stand out as the most promising for the global community to adopt. 
Such partnerships include Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), and innovative ways to 
restrict financial transactions to belligerent states. While these programs.seek to counter 
the proliferation ofWMD and its relevant technology, each comes with its own set of 
legal issues for the international community to address. 
57 Hafezi, Parisa. "Iran Says it is Undeterred by EU Sanctions Plan" from Reuters News Service. 15 June 
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Cooperative Threat Reduction 
The end of the Cold War brought many challenges and opportunities to the 
international community and the new superpower: the United States. In order to secure 
and dismantle left over weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in 
former Soviet Union states, US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar proposed what is 
today referred to as the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program (CTR), housed under 
the Department ofDefense58• While a multilateral agreement endorsing CTR may not be 
attainable even though it enjoys broad international support, there are other legal 
agreements that are applicable to such efforts. CTR required the implementation of 
umbrella agreements, under which individual contracts for specific subprograms were 
developed. These initial agreements covered four difficult issues: taxation, liability, 
inspection and audit, and privileges and immunities59• 
During the first phase of the effort, the United focused on the four states of the 
former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their soil, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine. Originally the program was seen as a stopgap initiative to keep WMD from 
getting into the wrong hands. Under Phase 2 of the CTR, the program was permitted to 
create lasting structures and multiyear projects. Given that contracts often took three 
years to get into place, the inability to transfer funds to meet new contingencies was a 
significant constraint on program flexibility. This also meant the expansion of the 
program from a simply defense-based enterprise to one that included both the Department 
of Energy and Department of State. Today, the CTR program has entered a state of 
58 See Title 22 ofthe United States Code, § 68a concerning foreign relations. 
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maturity and has enjoyed a great deal of success. It has met nearly all of its objectives in 
the partner states including dismantling WMD infrastructure, securing technology and 
materials, increasing transparency, and supporting military cooperation 60• With these 
successes in mind, new agreements will now be needed to address emerging challenges. 
Applied to current threats like North Korea and Iran, as well as to some non-state 
actors, the CTR has the potential to not only foster cooperation among states without 
infringing on other's right to peace and security. By working with governments in 
pursuit of WMD for security-enhancing reasons, this program provides financial and 
technical support for acceptable defense mechanisms. Meanwhile, a state that partners 
with CTR demonstrates its willingness to comply witb accepted norms ofbehavior within 
tbe international system. The results of existing partnerships with former Soviet states 
illustrate the potential for success witb other actors once they agree that possession of 
WMD is not in their interest. A combination of incentives, technology, and recognition 
can work to coerce a state like Iran or North Korea to renew their commitment to the 
NPT and more fully engage with the global community. 
The Proliferation Security Initiative 
In order to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of WMD, 
their delivery systems, and related materials, the United States first proposed the PSI in 
the spring of2003 61 • While tbe PSI does not create a new international legal framework 
on its own, it does seek to use existing national authorities and international law to 
achieve its goals. Existing membership in tbe PSI stands at 95 countries as of August 
60 See Nunn-Lugar Scorecard found at <http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html> 
61 Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, May 31,2003. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2003/05/20030531-3 .html 
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200962 • Through coordinated training activities and shared resources governed by the 
Operational Experts Group, this network of states is committed to providing information 
that might contribute to PSI efforts through intelligence and other national means63 • To 
date, the PSI has been responsible for dozens of interdictions as reported by government 
officials at liberty to comment on intelligence activities64• Still, challenges related to 
"flags of convenience" as well as noncompliance by key states make success of the 
program more difficult to achieve and further legal action more necessary. 
A number of multilateral, bilateral, and domestic agreements comprise the existing 
legal framework necessary to thwart the trafficking, smuggling, and spread of illicit 
material around the globe. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas can 
act as a guide in determining the capabilities and limits on states to protect their interest 
in the global commons. In the case of the PSI, these guidelines can be found in measures 
pertaining to the boarding of vessels on the high seas, navigation of international waters 
and those within a state's jurisdiction, as well as the appropriate use of force for 
interdicting suspect ships65 • As previously mentioned, the United Nations recently 
endorsed parts of the PSI in Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls upon states to 
"refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, 
acquire, manufacture, posses, transport, transfer, or use" WMD and directs member states 
to "adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws" that forbid non-state actors from 
62 For a current list, see http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm 
63 The 20 members of the OEG are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and the United States. http://www.state.gov/tlisn/11549J.htm 
64 Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, Warsaw, Poland, June 23, 
2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/tlus/rm/68269.htm. 
65 See UN Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
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doing so66• This measure has been implemented to enforce UNSC Resolution 1874, 
which requires interdiction of WMD and other weapons going to and from North 
Korea, 67 and more recently in Resolution 1929 that impacts nonproliferation efforts 
related to Iran68• Furthermore, the 2005 Protocol for the Convention on Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation "creates a ship boarding 
regime based on flag state consent similar to agreements that the United States has 
concluded bilaterally as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative"69• Together, these 
agreements promote the mission of the PSI by demonstrating international support for the 
interdiction of shipments suspected to be carrying technology or materials designated for 
WMD construction. 
In addition to those agreements promoted by the United Nations, other 
international organizations also work to strengthen the nonproliferation regime through 
the development of norms ofbehavior designed to limit the spread of illicit material. . 
Organizations like NATO, the IAEA, and INTERPOL require strong coordination among 
intelligence agencies from contributing states. While the sharing of information may 
seem counterproductive to a state's security interests, the broader goals of 
nonproliferation overcome many country differences. The United States has made it part 
of its national security doctrine to combat the spread of WMD and related technology and 
materials as stated in actions taken by each branch of government. President Bush's 
66 See UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 
67 See UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) 
68 See UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) 
69 Protocol for the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(2005) I 
30 I Page 
Executive Order 13382 prohibits U.S. persons from doing business with entities 
designated because of their proliferation activities 70. The US Treasury took steps to 
weaken the capabilities of those who seek nuclear weapons and illicit materials through 
strict controls on exports and financial transactions. Even the United States Supreme 
Court handed down a decision in June 2010, which outlawed any material support to non-
state actors that are designated as threats to US national securit/1• From these mandates 
and a clear legal roadmap, the US intelligence community is equipped to work toward the 
goal of stopping the spread of weapons technology and other dangerous materials. 
Joint Data Exchange Center 
Another venture established between the US and Russia may also apply to 
emerging threats to international peace and security. The Joint Data Exchange Center 
(JDEC), which is intended to sit in Moscow, was designed to promote exchange of 
information derived from each side's missile launch warning systems on the launches of 
ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. It will also serve as the repository for the 
notifications to be provided as part of an agreed system for exchanging pre-launch 
notifications as welL While planning for such an entity began in 1998 between US 
President Clinton and Russian President Y eltsin, little has been executed over the past 
two administrations to carry out the proposed project. Still, both governments continued 
to profess strong support for the center as it promotes safety and security in a volatile 
geopolitical environment. In July 2005, US officials announced that terms had been 
reached on what was considered the most troublesome aspect of the project: an 
70 See Executive Order 13382 (June 2005) 
71 See-Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010) 
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agreement for both sides to dispose of34 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium. Yet 
the deal has yet to take effect because Moscow has not given its formal approval. In fact, 
American officials repeatedly describe the delay as merely a product of the bureaucratic 
process 72• 
The JDEC would allow parties to exchange information in real time and across 
more than just offensive weapons. The purpose of sharing such data is to mitigate the 
possibility that benign activities are misinterpreted as an attack, similar to the 1963 
Hotline Agreement between the US and Soviet Union. As the first bilateral agreement 
between adversaries, this type of partnership may act as a guide for future collaboration 
with more states73 • In an age in which WMD and missile technology are available on 
black markets and sold as dual use goods, early-warning systems may be the most 
realistic solution to concerns over rogue governments and non-state actors in possession 
of such material. Countries may also use the center to examine strategies related to 
missile defense, defensive weapons, and space sensors. A number of misunderstandings 
and disagreements have occurred since the introduction of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, or Star Wars, by President Reagan in 1983 74• The establishment of an open 
forum in which data and proposals are exchanged may enhance cooperation in this area 
and further limit states that wish to develop WMD with the intention of threatening 
regional or international security. 
72 Remarks from interview with General James E. Cartwright on "Joint Data Exchange Center Hold.". June 
2006. Accessed from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006 _ 06/Cartwrightlnterview> 
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Restrictions on Financial Transactions 
The United States, European Union, and other members of the international 
community may also exert significant pressure on rogue actors in the form of financial 
restrictions. The US statute known as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) 
and the International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998 have been used in a number of instances 
to prevent capital from flowing toward states that align themselves against American 
interests. Furthermore, international agreements including several specific treaties under 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were designed to 
impose penalties on actors who support corrupt governments including Iran. Ultimately, 
these measures give teeth to sanctions that are designed to limit illegal activity of corrupt 
governments. The global community, through cooperation with multinational 
corporations, has the ability to severely restrict Iran's nuclear ambitions through firm 
economic constraints. Given the history of the FCPA and its impact on foreign policy, 
the US government is well equipped to enforce sanctions against states that are found in 
violation of international agreements through such legal mechanisms. 
The FCP A as well as other statutes and treaties provide the US government and 
international community with a legal framework to stop corruption. Signed into law in 
1977, the FCPA was originally designed to meet transparency requirements for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to prohibit bribery of foreign officials. 
The statute permits the United States to have extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
corporations and individuals that file reports with the SEC or have their principal place of 
business in the United States. Two provisions of the 1977 Act also provide criminal 
penalties for American businesses that use "interstate commerce" to further a transaction 
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offer or "anything of value" to a foreign official or to a political party as a way of 
influenCing the individual's decision-making. Criminal penalties for violations of the 
FCPA range from $100,000 fines and/or five years imprisonment for individuals to $2 
million for corporations. Furthermore, a civil penalty of$10,000 for corporations can be 
incurred when the Attorney General takes appropriate action in district court by placing 
limits on corrupt activity75• 
The international community has developed its own mechanisms for fighting 
bribery between states and businesses. In 1997, the OECD adopted a Convention on 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. This 
document, signed by all member states and five others, provided a means for controlling 
financial investments by legal persons that aid corruption 76• The following year, the 
United States adopted implementing legislation know as the International Anti-Bribery 
Act to bring itself into compliance with the treaty. As a result, the new legislation 
included a "knowing" standard that explicitly defined levels of disregard and "willful 
blindness" which includes a "conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." Thus, the 
statute's primary focus was not on the amount of the financial transaction, but rather the 
intent of individual or corporation in entering corrupt contracts 77 • 
The FCP A has had a significant impact on business practices around the world. 
The first major case involving the FCPA and a noncUS company took place in October 
2006. In its proceedings against the Norwegian company, the United States government 
asserted that it had jurisdiction over Statoil on the basis of its listing on the U .S. stock 
75 See Title 15 pfthe United States Code §78dd-1 
76 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998. Pub.L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302. 
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exchange. Although the case was eventually dismissed, it demonstrated the extent to 
which the US was willing to go to curb corruption and bribery especially when involving 
Iran 78 • The largest fine incurred for a violation of the FCPA took place in December 
2008, in which the German company Siemens was fined $800 million for bribes to 
foreign officials including those in Iraq, Nigeria, China, and Vietnam. To further remedy 
the situation, Siemens was forced to replace senior management and hire an American 
lawyer as its first compliance director. These, and other measures, were implemented in 
order to not only legally rectifY its actions, but also to improve its image and reputation 
with shareholders and consumers around the world 79• Efforts to prosecute corporations 
and individuals under the FCP A have increased over the past year as a result of growing 
pressure on government officials in the United States to crack down on foreign 
investments in rogue states like Iran. In fact, the Justice Department has prosecuted over 
20 companies and individuals in recent months for sending a range of sensitive 
technology to Iran, including missile guidance systems, military aircraft parts and 
components for improvised explosive devices80• 
The aforementioned examples highlight the utility of the FCPA as a policy tool 
for the United States to use against states that violate international agreements when 
lacking a firm resolution from the UN Security Council. Despite the obvious benefits the 
78 US Department of Justice. "U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company that Bribed Iranian Official." 
13 October 2006. Accessed from <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/0ctober/06 _ crm _700.html> 
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statute provides to the US government, it may result in unintended consequences for the 
private sector. The impact on multinational corporations could include a loss of potential 
revenue as a result of contract termination and increased costs to businesses due to 
expensive legal compliance. Moreover, the vague nature of the "knowing" requirements 
force industry to choose between missed business opportunities or severe penalties 
depending on whether or not it elects to engage with a state that may be subject to 
sanctions. 
As a result of increased pressure from shareholders and corporate boards, many 
more companies are now voluntarily pulling their business ventures out of rogue states in 
order to avoid entanglements with the law. In fact, both Royal Dutch Shell and Ingersoll-
Rand cut back on their business operations in Iran as recently as May 20 I 0 due to 
mounting efforts by the US and European governments as well as continued sanctions 
from the Security Council81 • From here, governments have the opportunity to build on 
current practices with more robust solutions for tackling corruption. 
On the international level, the OECD conventions provide a clear framework for 
states to confront bribery. Still, the US and its allies may be able to expand on the simple 
text of the agreement to develop an information-sharing mechanism that supports these 
efforts by combining resources and maximizing impact on multinational corporations. 
The resulting fines could be used to further encourage companies and individuals to 
disengage with rogue states or to support diplomatic channels to increase cooperation at 
little additional cost to the United States government. 
81 Nixon, Ron. "2 Muitinationals Pull Back From Iran" in New York Times. 10 March 2010; Accessed 
from <http://www .nytimes.com/20 I 0/03/I 1/world/middleeast!I I iran.html> 
361 Page 
\ 
A second set of proposals that would augment the effectiveness of the FCP A and 
other statutes is the training of arbitrators who would work within the legal frameworks 
of the law to enforce its provisions. This class oflitigators would require knowledge of 
both the legal constraints as well as the specific nature of the business transaction in 
question. In the case oflran, this group would needschooling in nuclear science in order 
to best understand which industries or parts are applicable under the law. This tribunal 
would provide oversight, legitimacy, and transparency for economic sanctions that stand 
to benefit the US government and its allies while detracting from the rogue state's ability 
to be seen as a victim of worldwide oppression. 
Finally, a method for enforcing continued compliance under both the FCPA and 
OECD treaties is essential for effective sanctions against corrupt governments like Iran. 
A monitoring mechanism such as the International Atomic Energy Agency could be 
applied to the business sector to provide credibility and accountability for governments 
and consumers in their efforts to limit dangerous practices such as nuclear proliferation. 
This body would have an obligation to member states to report breaches and identify 
specific sectors of industry most affected by economic sanctions. States that violate their 
obligations under the framework will likely incur harsher penalties due to increased 
exposure of breaches to the international business community. The United States and 
others would be supported in their efforts to persuade actors like Iran to limit illegal 
activity through collaboration with private entities that influence international trade. 
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Decisive action taken today stands to impact the course of international peace and 
security as the global community becomes more closely connected through globalization 
and technological innovation. In the case oflran, some view the proposed sanctions on 
as a means of strengthening and complementing the actions taken by the UN Security 
Council, which failed to target Tehran's energy sector, a leading source of income for 
Iran. Yet, despite the ambitious language of both the United States and European Union, 
it remains to be seen whether these restrictions will be taken up by other states and 
whether the sanctions will shape Iranian incentives regarding its nuclear program. One 
must always consider the possible repercussions of unilateral sanctions that go beyond 
those imposed by the UNSC, including the likely strengthening of ties between China, 
Russia, and Iran and the potential polarization of the UNSC over the issue of the Iranian 
nuclear program. To mitigate this potential strain on multilateral efforts to thwart 
proliferation of WMD in a globalized world, partnerships among allies and adversaries 
should be formed now to bring consensus and cooperation in the globalized world of the 
Twenty-First Century. 
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